This essay explores the implications of historicising John Rawls’s theory of justice. While historical research on Rawls and his social context has provided valuable insights, some scholars argue that historicising carries significant philosophical consequences. This paper critically examines one such argument that contends that historicising Rawls’s theory demonstrates its contextual nature, undermines its diagnostic powers, and leads to its complete dissolution. We offer a reconstruction of this argument and show that it fails. Further, while we argue that this argument fails, (...) we go on to suggest that historical evidence may contribute to a defensive argument against appeals to expert opinion. By examining the appropriate relationship between historical research and philosophy, this essay contributes to the evaluation of the historicist critique and offers insights into the broader role of historical research in philosophical discourse. (shrink)

This essay defends a rational reconstruction of a genealogical debunking argument that begins with the premise “that's just what the economic elite want you to believe” and ends in the conclusion “you should lower your confidence in your belief.” The argument is genealogical because it includes a causal explanation of your beliefs; it is debunking because it claims that the contingencies uncovered by the genealogy undermine your beliefs. The essay begins by defending a plausible causal explanation of your belief in (...) terms of the wants of the elite. Then a number of recent objections to genealogical debunking arguments are considered. It is argued that the genealogy offered in the first part constitutes evidence that a testimony-based belief is not safe and therefore does not constitute knowledge if the economic elite wants you to believe it. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

This article sets out to describe and solve two puzzles that emerge in segregated labour markets (e.g. the USA or Sweden). First, in many hiring contexts people profess to adhere to egalitarian norms, and specifically to a qualification norm according to which job qualification should be the basis of employment. Still there is evidence of frequent norm violations (discrimination). Surprisingly, the norm persists and people do not frequently protest against such norm violations. The second puzzle is that people are suspicious (...) of the hiring of minorities, perceiving such hirings as evidence that a ‘political correctness’ norm has replaced the qualification norm. The article proposes that both puzzles can be solved within a game-theoretical model of social norm-following, where implicit bias is introduced into an ‘employment game’. Within this model, implicit bias plays a double role. First, it interferes with employers' hiring decisions regarding ethnic majority and minority members, respectively. This is the standard way of understanding the effects of implicit bias. Second, implicit bias interferes with bystander evaluations of hired candidates' qualifications. This is a hitherto overlooked effect of implicit bias. The article concludes that once we understand the double role of implicit bias, the two puzzles are resolved. (shrink)

A brief examination of the most recent literature in philosophy of science shows that a host of research in this area studies the fictionalist approach to scientific models and related approaches such as van Fraassen's latest book (2008) on scientific representation. Van Fraassen's idea, to put it bluntly, relies on the idea that measurement is the main instrument by the means of which natural sciences achieve the representation aims expressed by scientific models. Moreover, if scientific knowledge is associated with the (...) deployment of some kind of explicative power, this power is closely related to the representation devices developed between the 17 th and 18 th century, when these were conceived as involving specific forms of measurement: measurement locates the target in a theoretically constructed logical space (van Fraassen 2008, p.2). The main objective of our talk is to delve into the logical features of such kind of approaches: the point is to understand the location-mechanism. On one hand we will follow a seminal idea of Olsson and Westlund (2006) that proposed to add to a scientific model a set of open questions (its scientific agenda), and on the other, we will deploy a recent proposal of Rahman/Redmond (2015) to conceive objects of models as functions (dependent-proof objects) of hypothetical judgments as formulated in the frame of constructive type theory. Against such a background, the point is how to relate those functions with the purported targets of the scientific model they constitute. Our main claim is that this achieved by a mapping. The specification mechanism of such a mapping, we claim, is related to those questions that constitute the agenda of the underlying theory and more particularly to the questions related to the relevant measurement theory. (shrink)

Discussion surrounding first contact with extra-terrestrial intelligence (ETI) is hotly debated in the literature. This paper responds to claims made by Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis that the ‘dominant thought’ in the philosophy of language indicates that communication with ETI would not be possible, and that the resultant uncertainty forces us into the Hobbesian Trap—the proclivity to adopt pre-emptive military strategies as a function of mutual distrust and fear of imminent attack. The ‘dominant thought’ in the philosophy of language constitutes (...) largely behaviourist thinking and hinges on ‘shared human context.’ However, shared universal contexts, together with the potential existence of post-biological ETI, suggest that communication at a level sufficient to interpret basic dispositions (what I call the level of ‘performative function’) may be possible. -/- Deploying both philosophical and game theoretical analyses, this paper provides several refutations and a repudiation of Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis's claims: I correct the assumption that ETI would necessarily adopt a game theoretical rationality, critique the notion that ETI would choose a risk-dominant strategy rather than a payoff-dominant strategy, repudiate the claim that communication with ETI would not be possible, and show how the Hobbesian equivalence principle is violated in a proximal first-contact situation. Finally, in the absence of game theoretic decision-making (and inline with the calls from the Billingham report), this paper commences work on the development of an incomplete set of Axioms of First Contact from which to generate a definitive groundwork for both post-detection protocol and rules of engagement. An open invitation to other contributors to criticise, augment, and advance this bottom-up approach to first contact is extended. -/- . (shrink)

The book that the French reader holds in his hands is one of the century’s most fascinating and liberating. It does nothing less than instigate the psychoanalytic approach as a universal method of...

Artificial intelligence and robots may progressively take a more and more prominent place in our daily environment. Interestingly, in the study of how humans perceive these artificial entities, science has mainly taken an anthropocentric perspective (i.e., how distant from humans are these agents). Considering people’s fears and expectations from robots and artificial intelligence, they tend to be simultaneously afraid and allured to them, much as they would be to the conceptualisations related to the divine entities (e.g., gods). In two experiments, (...) we investigated the proximity of representation between artificial entities (i.e., artificial intelligence and robots), divine entities and natural entities (i.e., humans and other animals) at both an explicit (Study 1) and an implicit level (Study 2). In the first study, participants evaluated these entities explicitly on positive and negative attitudes. Hierarchical clustering analysis showed that participants’ representation of artificial intelligence, robots and divine entities were similar, while the representation of humans tended to be associated with that of animals. In the second study, participants carried out a word/non-word decision task including religious semantic-related words and neutral words after the presentation of a masked prime referring to divine entities, artificial entities and natural entities (or a control prime). Results showed that after divine and artificial entity primes, participants were faster to identify religious words as words compared to neutral words arguing for a semantic activation. We conclude that people make sense of the new entities by relying on already familiar entities and in the case of artificial intelligence and robots, people appear to draw parallels to divine entities. (shrink)

In order to describe the logic of morality, "contractualist" philosophers have studied how individuals behave when they choose to follow their moral intuitions. These individuals, contractualists note, often act as if they have bargained and thus reached an agreement with others about how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mutual cooperation. Using this observation, such philosophers argue that the purpose of morality is to maximize the benefits of human interaction. The resulting "contract" analogy is both insightful and puzzling. On (...) one hand, it captures the pattern of moral intuitions, thus answering questions about human cooperation: why do humans cooperate? Why should the distribution of benefits be proportionate to each person's contribution? Why should the punishment be proportionate to the crime? Why should the rights be proportionate to the duties? On the other hand, the analogy provides a mere as-if explanation for human cooperation, saying that cooperation is "as if" people have passed a contract-but since they didn't, why should it be so? To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing contract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the missing "designer" of life-forms, a puzzle that Darwin's theory of natural selection essentially resolved. Evolutionary and contractualist theory originally intersected at the work of philosophers John Rawls and David Gauthier, who argued that moral judgments are based on a sense of fairness that has been naturally selected. In this book, Nicolas Baumard further explores the theory that morality was originally an adaptation to the biological market of cooperation, an arena in which individuals competed to be selected for cooperative interactions. In this environment, Baumard suggests, the best strategy was to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation in a fair way, so that those who offered less than others were left out of cooperation while those who offered more were exploited by their partners. It is with this evolutionary approach that Baumard ultimately accounts for the specific structure of human morality. (shrink)

Le dernier étage de l’ Aufbau de Carnap est occupé par le type des objets culturels . L’examen des remarques fugitives de Carnap et la formulation des embarras ou des lacunes qu’elles manifestent montrent notamment, de l’intérieur, les faiblesses du cadre extensionnaliste en ce qui concerne la compréhension des objets culturels. La mention comparative de certains essais phénoménologiques d’ontologie des objets culturels suggère d’autres voies .The last floor of the Carnap's Aufbau by is inhabited by the type of cultural objects (...) . The examination of Carnap's brief remarks and the formulation of the embarrassments or the lacunas they exhibit show, from within, the weaknesses of the extensionalist framework for the comprehension of cultural objects. The comparative mention of phenomenological attempts at an ontology of cultural objects suggests other ways of handling them. (shrink)

What does it mean to be a morally good person? It can be tempting to think that it is simply a matter of performing certain actions and avoiding others. And yet there is much more to moral character than our outward actions. We expect a good person to not only behave in certain ways but also to experience the world in certain ways within.

This study investigates the social–psychological mechanisms leading individuals in organizations to engage in environmental citizenship behaviors, which entail keeping abreast of, and participating in, the environmental affairs of a company. Informed by the corporate greening and organizational behavior literature, we suggested that an employee’s level of involvement in the management of a company’s environmental impact was the overt manifestation of his or her discretionary sense of commitment to environmental concerns in the work context, and that such commitment developed through the (...) interplay of individual, organizational, and supervisory factors. Our general findings support the idea that when environmental protection is valued and encouraged by the company and line managers, organization members are more likely to experience a volitional sense of attachment and responsibility to corporate environmental goals and values, which is enacted through citizenship behaviors. We also expected that individual ecological beliefs would strengthen the environmental commitment of employees via identification with, and adherence to, the socially responsible cause embodied by the organization and its managerial staff. But it did not. On the contrary, the data indicated that corporate environmental policy is more likely to influence an employee’s level of environmental commitment when he or she holds weak versus strong personal ecological beliefs. Theoretical and managerial implications of our findings are discussed. (shrink)

The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, and with that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori truth, is being abandoned in much of analytic philosophy and the philosophy of most of the sciences. These distinctions should also be abandoned in the philosophy of mathematics. In particular, we must recognize the strong empirical component in our mathematical knowledge. The traditional distinction between logic and mathematics, on the one hand, and the natural sciences, on the other, should be dropped. Abstract (...) mathematical objects, like transcendental numbers or Hilbert spaces, are theoretical entities on a par with electromagnetic fields or quarks. Mathematical theories are not primarily logical deductions from axioms obtained by reflection on concepts but, rather, are constructions chosen to solve some collection of problems while fitting smoothly into the other theoretical commitments of the mathematician who formulates them. In other words, a mathematical theory is a scientific theory like any other, no more certain but also no more devoid of content. (shrink)

If you believe more things you thereby run a greater risk of being in error than if you believe fewer things. From the point of view of avoiding error, it is best not to believe anything at all, or to have very uncommitted beliefs. But considering the fact that we all in fact do entertain many specific beliefs, this recommendation is obviously in flagrant dissonance with our actual epistemic practice. Let us call the problem raised by this apparent conflict the (...) Addition Problem. In this paper we will find reasons to reject a particular premise used in the formulation of the Addition Problem, namely, the fundamental premise according to which believing more things increases the risk of error. As we will see, acquiring more beliefs need not decrease the probability of the whole, and hence need not increase the risk of error. In fact, more beliefs can mean an increase in the probability of the whole and a corresponding decrease in the risk of error. We will consider the Addition Problem as it arises in the context of the coherence theory of epistemic justification, while keeping firmly in mind that the point we wish to make is of epistemological importance also outside the specific coherentist dispute. The problem of determining exactly how the probability of the whole system depends on such factors as coherence, reliability and independence will be seen to open up an interesting area of research in which the theory of conditional independence structures is a helpful tool. (shrink)

Syllogisms (e.g. “All A are B; All B are C; What is true about A and C?”) are a long‐studied area of human reasoning. Riesterer, Brand, and Ragni compare a variety of models to human performance and show that not only do current models have a lot of room for improvement, but more importantly a large part of this improvement must come from examining individual differences in performance.

Penser l’acte de décider en droit comme une opération mentale d’interprétation conduit bien souvent à en faire un objet métaphysique donné à la connaissance du droit et non construit par elle. Cette réification implique également de recourir à un modèle causal de la décision judiciaire, lequel recèle de nombreuses difficultés au regard du caractère proprement juridique d’une telle enquête. En appréhendant cette problématique de la décision par les outils de la philosophie analytique de l’esprit et de l’action, cet article entend (...) défendre une autre approche qui, dans le prolongement des travaux du juriste Hans Kelsen, s’efforce de penser la décision judiciaire comme un acte de justification au sein d’un cadre de rationalité stipulé. (shrink)

After 100+ years of studying syllogistic reasoning, what have we learned? Well, Riesterer and colleagues suggest that we have learned to throw away most of the data! If that seems like a bad idea to you then, be assured, that the authors agree with you. The sad fact is that the conclusion of “No Valid Conclusion” (NVC) is one of the most frequently selected responses in syllogistic reasoning but these “majority data” have been ignored by most researchers. Riesterer and colleagues (...) introduce heuristic rules for predicting NVC and provide directions to modelers on how to up their game. (shrink)

Resumen El lamento por el fin de la utopía que expresa la novela futurista, Cría terminal (2014), expone la crisis de un ideal ético: la pérdida de la posibilidad de un mundo mejor. Las bases del contrato moral implícitas en la amenaza de su disolución en un futuro cercano serán el objeto de indagación de este trabajo, que toma a la filosofía de Hans Jonas como principal referencia teórica. Se buscará, por consiguiente, precisar la relación entre la barbarización de la (...) cultura (con sus comportamientos y personajes modélicos) y los procesos económico-políticos tendientes a la dominación biotecnológica del medio humano. La perspectiva modalizadora de la acción y la intriga narrativas y su adecuación a un interés de tipo ético por establecer un modelo de vida óptimo para la sociedad, defraudado por la civilización técnica del futuro, serán motivo de análisis. Abstract The lament for the end of utopia which expresses the futuristic novel, Cría Terminal (2014), exposes the crisis of an ethical ideal: the loss of the possibility of a better world. The bases of the moral contract implicit in the threat of its dissolution in the near future will be the object of investigation of this work, which considers the philosophy of Hans Jonas as the main theoretical reference. Therefore, it will be sought to specify the relationship between the barbarization of culture (with its exemplary behaviors and characters) and the economic-political processes tending to the biotechnological domination of the human environment. The modalizing perspective of the narrative action and intrigue and its adaptation to an ethical interest in establishing an optimal life model for society, disappointed by the technical civilization of the future, will be the subject of analysis. (shrink)

An innovative literary analysis of Freud's "Wolf Man.".

Punitive behaviours are often assumed to be the result of an instinct for punishment. This instinct would have evolved to punish wrongdoers and it would be the evidence that cooperation has evolved by group selection. Here, I propose an alternative theory according to which punishment is a not an adaptation and that there was no specific selective pressure to inflict costs on wrongdoers in the ancestral environment. In this theory, cooperation evolved through partner choice for mutual advantage. In the ancestral (...) environment, individuals were in competition to be recruited in cooperative ventures and it was vital to share the benefits of cooperation in a mutually advantageous manner. If individuals took a bigger share of the benefits, their partners would leave them for more interesting partners. If they took a smaller share, they would be exploited by their partners who would receive more than what they had contributed to produce. This competition led to the selection of a sense of fairness, a cognitive adaptation aiming to share equally the benefits of cooperation in order to attract partners. In this theory, punishment is not necessary for the evolution of cooperation. Punitive behaviours are only a way to restore fairness by compensating the victim or penalizing the culprit. Drawing on behavioural economics, legal anthropology, and cognitive psychology, I show that empirical data fit better with this framework than with the theory of group selection. When people punish, they do so to restore fairness rather than to help the group. (shrink)

Este dossier contiene cuatro artículos que son el resultado de una labor colectiva y continuada de un equipo de investigadores y filósofos argentinos en torno a la obra de Hans Kellner. Desde sus primeros artículos sobre White, el narrativismo y su aplicación a la historiografía, los aportes de Kellner destacaron por una sutileza y un horizonte teórico al proponer una lectura oblicua, tensiva de los problemas, los autores y los textos objeto de su interpretación. Entendemos que el conjunto de sus (...) contribuciones, que recorremos en el presente dossier, constituye un aporte fundamental a un esbozo de una teoría retórica -en sentido estricto- de la historia. ARK: ark:/s18537960/oakjkrt2r. (shrink)

How do humans manage to keep track of a gradually changing object or person as the same persisting individual despite the fact that the extraction of information about this individual must often rely on heterogeneous information sources and heterogeneous tracking methods? The article introduces the Empirical Tracking of Individuals theory to address this problem. This theory proposes an analysis of the concept of integrated tracking, which refers to the capacity to acquire, store, and update information about the identity and location (...) of individuals in our environment. It hypothesizes that certain functions of attention are a key to explaining how the cognitive flexibility of the human mind overcomes the heterogeneity of sources and methods in integrated tracking. At least two premises lend support to this hypothesis. First, heterogeneity of tracking sources is overcome by the combination of information from multiple perceptual modalities and a phenomenon of multisensory 'transparency'. Second, heterogeneity of tracking sources and methods may also be overcome by inferences that combine information across domains to acquire reasons to believe propositions about the target's location and identity. (shrink)

This article compares the ability to track individuals lacking mental states with the ability to track intentional agents. It explains why reference to individuals raises the problem of explaining how cognitive agents track unique individuals and in what sense reference is based on procedures of perceptual-motor and epistemic tracking. We suggest applying the notion of singular-files from theories in perception and semantics to the problem of tracking intentional agents. In order to elucidate the nature of agent-files, three views of the (...) relation between object- and agent-tracking are distinguished: the Independence, Deflationary and Organism-Dependence Views. The correct view is argued to be the latter, which states that perceptual and epistemic tracking of a unique human organism requires tracking both its spatio-temporal object-properties and its agent-properties. (shrink)

Strong reciprocity theorists claim that punishment has evolved to promote the good of the group and to deter cheating. By contrast, weak reciprocity suggests that punishment aims to restore justice (i.e., reciprocity) between the criminal and his victim. Experimental evidences as well as field observations suggest that humans punish criminals to restore fairness rather than to support group cooperation.